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TENTH UPDATE TO COLORADO WATER LAW: AN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
JUSTICE GREGORYJ. HOBBS, JR.
To provide our readers with the most up-to-date water law information, the
editors periodically include updates of works previously published in the Water
Law Review. The following is the tenth update to Colorado Water Law; An
Historical Ovemew,Appendtx-Colorado Water Law: A Synopsis of Statutes
and Case Law,' selected by the Honorable Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr.'
UPPER BLACK SQUIRREL GROUND WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT V.
CHEROKEE METROPOLTAN DISTRICT
"Upper Black Squirrel appealed from an order of the water court
interpreting an earlier stipulated decree, to which it and Cherokee Metropolitan
were parties, concerning the latter's rights to ground water in the Upper Black
Squirrel Basin and, particularly, its right to export water for use outside the
basin. Upper Black Squirrel sought a declaration that a provision of the
stipulation, which required Cherokee to deliver wastewater returns back into
the basin for recharge of the aquifer, barred Cherokee and Meridian, another
metropolitan district with which Cherokee had entered into an intergovernmental agreement, from claiming credit for these wastewater returns as
replacement water, for purposes of acquiring the right to additional pumping
from Cherokee's wells in the basin. The water court ruled instead that nothing
in the stipulation, and particularly not its use of the word 'recharge,' implied
abandonment or forfeiture of any right Cherokee might otherwise have to claim
future credits with the Ground Water Commission."
Upper Black Squirrel Creek Ground Water Mgrnt. Dist. v. Cherokee
Metro. Dist., 351 P.3d 408, 410-11 (2015).
"Unlike the 'waters of any natural stream,' the management of designated
ground water is governed by the Colorado Ground Water Management Act.
The allocation of rights to the use of ground water, which has been

1. Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Colorado Water Law: An Hstorical Overview, 1 U. DENV.
WATER L. REV. 1, 27 (1997). The first update to Justice Hobbs's article appears at 2 U. DENV.
WATER L. REv. 223 (1999); the second update is at 4 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 111 (2000); the
third update is at 6 U. DENY. WATER L. REV. 116 (2002); the fourth update is at 8 U. DENv.
WATER L. REV. 213 (2004); the fifth update is at 10 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 391 (2007); the
sixth update is at 13 U. DENy. WATER L. REV. 389 (2009); the seventh update is at 14 U. DENV.
WATER L. REv. 159 (2010); the eighth update is at 16 U. DENY. WATER L. REV. 137 (2012); the
ninth update is at 18 U. DENV. WATER L. Rrv. 390 (2015).

2. Internal citations and footnotes have been omitted from segments of the opinions
reproduced below, with few exceptions.
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characterized as a modified prior appropriation regime, is determined by
application to the Ground Water Commission, which is charged with, among
other things, ensuring that designated ground water aquifers are not
unreasonably depleted. Withdrawals of designated ground water can be made
under this system through the issuance of well permits pursuant to regulations
of the Commission and the local ground water district for the maintenance of
reasonable ground water pumping levels.
Id.at 412-13.
"The water court's order makes clear, and we agree, that the stipulation
bars Cherokee from reusing the exported water, regardless of any right to reuse
foreign water that it might otherwise have had and, instead, requires Cherokee
to make its best efforts to recapture the specified wastewater returns and upon
recapture to deliver them back into the Upper Black Squirrel Creek Basin for
recharge of the aquifer. Whether or not Cherokee may yet derive some benefit
from stipulating away its right to reuse the foreign water it has developed and
agreeing instead to pump the unused portion of that water back into the basin,
is a matter that is simply beyond the scope of the stipulation. Recharging, or
replenishing, an aquifer clearly serves to prevent or at least mitigate its being
mined; but the determination whether the resultant state of the aquifer is such
that water is available for further appropriation, and if so, who should be granted
such an appropriation, and on what terms, are all questions governed by a
different authority, according to rules and regulations promulgated for that
purpose."
Id.at 414.
"Depending upon the specific context or designated purposes for which the
recharge of an aquifer were required, the term 'recharge' could have additional
implications, but standing alone it simiply refers to the physical act of
replenishing the aquifer. As the state engineer later put it in advising UBS
concerning the need to clarify its rules, "Recharge' could mean the physicalact
of rechargingwater into an aquifer with loss of dominion and control, or the
physical act of recharge in a recharge/storage/recovery plan approved by the
Conunission under Designated Basin Rule 5.8, or the physicalact ofrechar'ng
replacement water under a replacement plan.' We agree with the water court
that nothing in paragraph 5's requirement for Cherokee to deliver wastewater
back into the basin for recharge of the aquifer implies that it either must or must
not be entitled to credit in a subsequent application to the Ground Water
Commission for further appropriation."
Id.
ST.JUDE'S Co. v. ROARING FoRK CLUB, LLC.
"The application indicated that the RFC Ditch is a flow-through structure
located entirely on Club land, which returns water to the Roaring Fork River
approximately one half-mile downstream from its point of diversion, and that
the Club used the water in question and the RFC Ditch itself as an 'aesthetic
and recreational amenity to a golf course development, as well as for fish habitat
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and as a private fly-fishing stream.' The Club sought a decree for the amount
in question for 'aesthetic, recreation, and piscatorial uses.'"
St. Jude's Co. v. Roaring Fork Club, L.L.C., 351 P.3d 442, 446 (Colo.
2015).
"[T]he constitution guarantees Colorado's system of prior appropriation as
it had developed since territorial days and protects tfie people of the state from
divestment of appropriation. Under this system, '[a] water right comes into
existence by applying state water to beneficial use.' This system differs
dramatically from 'the commnon law doctrine giving the riparian owner a right
to tie flow of water in its natural channel upon and over his lands,' which was
quickly found to be 'inapplicable in Colorado.' In particular, 'the right to the
maintenance of the "flow" of the stream is a riparian right and is completely
inconsistent with the doctrine of prior appropriation."'
Id. at 448.
"The 1969 Act defines a 'water right' as 'a right to use in accordance with
its priority a certain portion of the waters of the state by reason of the
appropriation of the same,' and defines 'appropriation' as 'the application of a
specified portion of the waters of the state to beneficial use pursuant to the
procedures prescribed by law."'

Id. at 448-49
"In three subparts of the 1969 Act's definition of beneficial use, the General
Assembly has gone beyond the meaning of 'beneficial,' providing legislative
approval for three specific applications of water, for specified purposes: (1) the
inpoundment of water for firefighting or storage for any purpose for which an
appropriation is lawftlly made, including recreational, fishery, or wildlife
purposes; (2) the appropriation by the state of Colorado, for the benefit and
enjoyment of present and future generations and in the manner prescribed by
law, of such minimum flows between specific points or levels for and on natural
streams and lakes as are required to preserve the natural environment to a
reasonable degree; and (3) the diversion of water by a county, municipality, city
and county, water district, water and samitation district, water conservation
district, or water conservancy district for recreational in-chamel diversion
purposes.
The latter two beneficial uses, both of which involve the use of water
instream, are highly regulated. Instream flows to preserve the natural
environment may only be appropriated by the Colorado Water Conservation
Board ("CWCB"), a state agency with a "statutory fiduciary duty" to the people
of Colorado to both protect the environment and appropriate only the
minimum amount of water necessary to do so, and these appropriations
undergo extensive review by the CWCB, subject to notice and comment, and
by an adjudicating water court."
Id. at 449.
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"The Club's proposed 'uses' of the water in question, as expressed in its
application, cannot be beneficial within the meaning of the Act because the only
purpose they are offered to serve is the subjective enjoyment of the Club's
private guests. The flow of water necessary to efliciendy produce beauty,
excitement, or fun cannot even conceptually be quantified, and therefore where
these kinds of subjective experiences are recognized by the legislature to be
valuable, it has specifically provided for their public enjoyment, scientific
administration, and careful measurement. See, e.g., § 37-92-102 (restricting
appropriation of instream flows and in-channel diversions to particular
purposes and amounts as determined by a state agency bound by fiduciary duty,
and with public participation. Without describing a purpose for the accomplishment of which a measurable amount of water, however approximate, must
be used, the Club, by definition, fails to articulate an intent to put the specific
amount of water it claims to a beneficial use."
Id. at 451.
Recognition of the Club's proposed uses would substantially undermine the
intent evident in the legislature's instream flow and RICD provisions. The
General Assembly has taken great care to limit recreational and environmental
uses of water in-channel, largely to deal with the potential dangers and excesses
inherent in capturing the flow of the stream. The Club would indisputably be
barred from appropriating rights for its asserted uses were the water in question
to remain in the natural course of the Roaring Fork River. In effect, the Club
seeks to accomplish by virtue of diversion what the legislature has expressly
prohibited instream: By using a diversion to effectively change the path of a
natural stream or a significant portion of it, the Club seeks approval for recreating a natural stream on its private property and adjudicating the rights to
enjoy the flows therein. This appropriation is tantamount to a 'forbidden
riparian right.' Because an appropriation requires actual application of a
portion of the waters of the state to a beneficial use, the Club cannot acquire
such a forbidden right simply by virtue of diversion.
For these reasons, the Club's asserted aesthetic, recreation, and piscatorial
uses, even when proven as alleged, do not qualify as beneficial uses under the
1969 Act. It is for the General Assembly to approve such unconventional
beneficial uses, as it has done with its instream and RICD provisions." See
People v. Emmert 198 Colo. 137, 597 P.2d 1025, 1029 (1979) ('If the
increasing demand for recreational space on the waters of this state is to be
accommodated, the legislative process is the proper method to achieve this
end.'); Bd.of Cniy. Conm'rs v. United States, 891 P.2d 952, 972 (Colo.1995)
('We have consistently recognized that the General Assembly has acted to
preserve the natural environment by giving authority to the Colorado Water
Conservation Board to appropriate water to maintain the natural environment,
and we will not intrude into an area where legislative prerogative governs.'
The water court's judgment decreeing the Club's new appropriative rights
must therefore be reversed, and the decree for aesthetic, recreation, and
piscatorial uses vacated."
Id. at 451-52.
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SAN ANTONIO, Los PINos AND CoNJEOs ACEQUIA PRESERVATION
ASSOCIATION V. SPECIAL IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT NO. 1 OF THE RIO
GRANDE WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT
"Members of the Subdistrict are landowners within the District who rely on
wells for all or part of their irrigation water supply for lands north of the Rio
Grande River within the closed basin area of the San Luis Valley, in Water
Division No. 3. As described in San Antonio, water levels in the unconfined
aquifer within the Subdistrict have declined significantly due to increased
groundwater consumption and sustained drought. The overall objective of the
Amended [Replacement] Plan is to provide a water management system of selfregulation within the Subdistrict (in lieu of state-imposed limits on the use of
irrigation wells) using economic-based incentives to promote responsible
management and use of irrigation water and ensure the protection of senior
surface water rights. Subdistrict members are required to contribute financially
(through assessment of various fees tethered in part to a farm unit's net
groundwater consumrption) to ftmd Subdistrict operations that, among other
activities, provide economic incentives to fallow or permanently retire lands to
reduce irrigation water consumption.
The Amended Plan requires the Subdistrict to prepare, and obtain the State
Engineer's approval of, an ARP that prevents injury to senior water rights. Each
ARP must estimate anticipated stream depletions caused by groundwater
pumping within the Subdistrict during the replacement plan year, including
lagged depletions caused by prior-year pumping. The ARP must then provide
a procedure and timeline to deliver replacement water to any injured rights on
the Rio Grande or Conejos Rivers or other stream, including delivery to Rio
Grande Compact gauges to reduce any Compact curtailment."
San Antonio, Los Pinos and Conjeos River Acequia Pres. Ass'n v. Rio
Grande Water Conservation Dist., 351 P.3d 1112, 1115-16 (Colo. 2015).
"We note that Objectors' challenges fail to allege or establish injury from
the operation of the 2012 ARP and Amended Plan but, instead, largely raise
legal challenges to these documents."
Id. at 1119.
"We hold that: (1) the water court was not authorized to reconsider the
Amended Plan's methodology that this court approved in San Antonio; (2)
courts are not required to stay operation of an ARP until all challenges are
resolved; (3) the 2012 ARP's inclusion of Closed Basin Project water as a source
of replacement water for depletions caused by Subdistrict well pumping was
adequate and suitable to prevent injury to senior surface water rights; and (4)
the inclusion of augmentation plan wells as Subdistrict wells for the purpose of
calculating total groundwater depletions did not violate the 2010 Decree or the
Amended Plan, and the omission of a separate list of augmentation plan wells
did not invalidate the 2012 ARP."
Id.at 1120.
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"IT]he water court correctly concluded that, to the extent Objectors'
challenges sought to resurrect issues with respect to the Amended Plan
addressed in San Antonio, this court's opinion was binding law of the case.
Under the law of the case doctrine, 'prior relevant rulings made in the same
case are to be followed unless such application would result in error or unless
the ruling is no longer sound due to changed conditions.' A trial court has
discretion to apply the law of the case doctrine to its own prior rulings.
However, the law of the case established by an appellate court must be followed
on remand in subsequent proceedings before a trial court. This principle
protects the finality of judgments and ensures lower courts' adherence to
decisions of higher courts."
Id
"The Closed Basin Decree explains the Closed Basin Project in detail and
states that 'It] he water developedby drainage and the operation of the proposed
wells would be collected in and tansported to' the Rio Grande. (Emphasis
added). The Decree similarly states that the project will 'collect and inMroduce
into the Rio Grande River a large volume of water' (emphasis added).
Regardless of whether such water is characterized as salvaged or developed, the
Closed Basin Decree makes clear that water produced by the Closed Basin
Project is water that would not otherwise have made its way to the Rio Grande.
Thus, the water court in this case could not presume that pumping Project wells
causes injury to senior surface rights, and Objectors presented no evidence that
Project water would in fact reach the Rio Grande without the Project's
operations. In any event, this court has previously rejected a similar challenge
based on Shelton Fams, as an impermissible collateral attack on the Closed
Basin Decree. [citation omitted] (noting that a final judgment by a court with
proper jurisdiction is not subject to collateral attack)."
Id.at 1123.
"We hold that the Closed Basin Project provided a suitable source of
replacement water in the 2012 ARP because "the water could simultaneously
meet Compact obligations and replace injurious depletions. We further hold
that use of the Closed Basin Project water rights for replacement falls within
their decreed purposes. Therefore, the water court properly concluded that
Closed Basin Project water was adequate and suitable to prevent injury to senior
surface right holders."
Id.at 1124.
TUCKER V. TOWN OF MINTURN
"This appeal requires us to decide whether a non-attorney trustee of a trust
may proceed pro se before the water court. Opposer-appellant J. Tucker,
Trustee, appeals the water court's order ruling that as trustee of a trust, he was
not pennitted to proceed pro se because he was representing the interests of
others.
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Addressing a matter of first ilpression in Colorado, we conclude that the
water court correctly ruled that as a non-attorney trustee, Tucker could not
proceed pro se on behalf of a trust."
Tucker v. Town of Minturn, 359 P.3d 29, 30 (Colo. 2015).
"Although we have not previously considered whether a trustee may
proceed pro se on behalf of a trust in a litigation matter, we have made clear in
a number of other contexts that a party who is not an attorney may not, without
counsel, represent the interests of others in a litigation matter.
'The purpose of the bar and our admission requirements is to protect the
public from incompetent legal advice and representation.' Non-attorneys are
thus prohibited from undertaking activities that require the exercise of legal
discretion or judgment on behalf of others."
Id. at31.
MERIDIAN SERVICE METROPOLITAN DISTRIcT v. GROUND WATER
COMMISSION
"We have long and consistently held that in the context of such a
jurisdictional conflict, the Commission must make the initial determination as
to whether the controversy implicates designated ground water. Jurisdiction
shifts to the water court only if the Commission concludes that the water at issue
is not designated ground water."
Meridian Serv. Metro. Dist. v. Ground Water Conmm'n, 361 P.3d 392, 396
(Colo. 2015).
"Meridian next contends that the district court erred when it ultimately
found that the water at issue was designated ground water... [The
detennmation of whether the water at issue was designated ground water turned
on whether, 'under natural conditions,' the water would be visible on the
surface, and whether, in its 'natural course,' it would be available for the
fulfillment of decreed surface rights."
Id.
"Here, the district court found: 'The precipitation that falls in the Basin
would sink into the ground and be part of the ground water supply under natural
or pre-development conditions and is water that would nonnally not be visible
on the surface under natural pre-development conditions in the Basin, except
during heavy rain events.' The court further found that the water that Meridian
sought to divert was merely runoff that had been increased by Meridian's
construction of impereable surfaces. Thus, the court concluded that the water
at issue was 'neither a "natural stream" nor water that is 'tributary to a natural
stream' under natural conditions.
Because each of these findings was amply supported by the record, we
conclude that the district court correctly found that a portion of the water
claimed by Meridian as a result of its development was designated ground water
over which the Commission had jurisdiction."
Id. at 396-97.
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"Specifically, when the General Assembly enacted the Management Act, it
affirmed that the prior appropriation doctrine applies to designated ground
water, and it directed the Conmmission to protect senior appropriators of ground
water. The legislature also recognized, however, that the doctrine should be
modified to permit the full economic development of designated groundwater.
The legislature thus rejected a pure appropriation doctrine for designated
ground water because, whereas surface streams 'are subject to seasonal
recharge,' water can be 'mined' from an aquifer to the point that it could take
many years to restore the water level. Accordingly, the Management Act
empowers the Commission to curtail ground water pumping when the amount
of water needed to fill a water right would, among other things, 'result in
withdrawing the ground water supply at a rate materially in excess of the
reasonably anticipated average rate of future recharge.'
The district court's order in this case was fully consistent with these
legislative determinations and, thus, with public policy."
Id. at 399.

